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DLD-178        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 20-3398 
___________ 
 
JOHN LEWIS GERHOLT, SR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN E. WETZEL, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; K. SUBEN, 
IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; STEPHEN ST. VINCENT, IN 
HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MS G. ORLANDO, IN HER 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; DAVID A. THOMAS, JR., IN HIS 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; C. STEFFENIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-04079) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 13, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2021) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
PER CURIAM          __________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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John Gerholt, Sr., an inmate at State Correctional Institution – Phoenix (“SCI-
Phoenix”) proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s 
order dismissing his amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for 
failure to state a claim.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm. 
I.  
In August 2020, Gerholt filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against WellPath “(aka) Correct Care 
Solutions,” a private contractual healthcare provider at SCI-Phoenix, as well as 
Pennsylvania Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, SCI-Phoenix Warden K. Soben,1 
Department of Corrections Director of Policy Stephen St. Vincent, and SCI-Phoenix 
employees David A. Thomas, Jr., Ms. G. Orlando, and C. Steffenio.  Gerholt sued all 
defendants in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Gerholt’s allegations arose out of a January 30, 2020 incident in which his hand 
became trapped in the pinch point of a closing cellblock door, injuring his fingers.  
Gerholt alleged that WellPath was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in 
its treatment of his injury, and that several of the individual defendants violated the 
Eighth Amendment by failing to provide warning signs at pinch points or otherwise 
 
1 For purposes of this opinion, we adopt the spelling of defendant Soben’s name utilized 
in Gerholt’s complaint and the District Court’s opinions. 
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guard against Gerholt’s injury.  Gerholt also alleged that defendants Soben, Orlando, and 
Steffenio violated his constitutional rights in their handling of a grievance he filed in 
relation to his injury and medical care.   
On August 31, 2020, the District Court dismissed Gerholt’s official capacity 
claims, grievance-related claims, and Eighth Amendment claims against the individual 
defendants with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) upon determining that leave to 
amend would be futile.  However, the District Court afforded Gerholt leave to amend his 
claim against WellPath to demonstrate that it had a policy or custom amounting to 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs or to allege deliberate indifference 
against an individual medical provider.   
Gerholt filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020.  The amended 
complaint no longer included WellPath as defendant and instead named the “SCI-
Phoenix Medical Department,” against which Gerholt raised similar allegations of 
inadequate medical care.  Gerholt otherwise raised largely the same allegations as those 
in his initial complaint against Wetzel, St. Vincent, Thomas, and Steffenio, naming 
several of those defendants in their individual and official capacities even though such 
claims were previously dismissed with prejudice.  Gerholt sought monetary damages.  
On November 5, 2020, the District Court sua sponte dismissed the amended 
complaint with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and terminated WellPath as a 
defendant.  Although the District Court had already dismissed Gerholt’s claims against 
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Wetzel, St. Vincent, Thomas, and Steffenio with prejudice in its August 31 opinion, it 
screened the amended complaint in its entirety and reiterated its reasons for dismissing 
those claims.  Gerholt timely appealed and filed a document in support of his appeal with 
this Court.2 
II.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s order dismissing the amended complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  As a pro se litigant, Gerholt is entitled to liberal construction of 
his complaint.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We may 
summarily affirm the District Court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if 
the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III.  
As an initial matter, the District Court properly concluded that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred Gerholt’s official capacity claims.  See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. 
 
2 In addition to referring to the November 5 order, Gerholt’s notice of appeal mentions an 
order entered November 3, 2020 dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.  The same 
day it issued that order, however, the District Court received the amended complaint.  
The District Court therefore vacated the November 3 order in its November 5 order. 
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Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a] state is generally entitled to 
immunity in federal court from suits by private parties,” and this protection extends to 
“state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages”).  As the District 
Court noted, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity 
with respect to the claims here at issue.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521(b), 8522(b). 
The District Court’s dismissal of Gerholt’s claims related to the handling of his 
grievance was also proper.  Gerholt alleged that Steffenio “apologized to” Gerholt after 
reviewing his allegations but did “not order the defective door fixed” and declined “to 
compensate plaintiff for [his] injury.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 8.  Insofar as Gerholt 
alleged a Due Process violation arising out of the handling of his grievance, the District 
Court correctly recognized that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison 
grievance procedures.  See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); Flick 
v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).  Further, to state a claim under 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had “personal involvement in the 
alleged wrongs,” which can be shown through particularized “allegations of personal 
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  While Gerholt conclusively alleged that Steffenio had 
“personal knowledge and involvement with the entire incident,” he did not allege 
particularized facts demonstrating Steffenio’s involvement in the conditions giving rise to 
Gerholt’s injury or in his medical treatment.  See Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 8.  The act 
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of merely responding to or reviewing a grievance does not rise to the level of personal 
involvement required to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.  Cf. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1208. 
Gerholt similarly failed to state a claim against the SCI-Phoenix Medical 
Department because a prison medical department is not a “person” that can be sued under 
§ 1983.  See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).  Gerholt 
did not name any individual medical providers as defendants in his amended complaint.  
The District Court was therefore correct to dismiss this claim.3 
The District Court also correctly dismissed Gerholt’s remaining Eighth 
Amendment claims.  As the District Court recognized, an Eighth Amendment conditions 
of confinement claim includes a subjective and an objective component.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  Specifically, a plaintiff must allege prison officials 
exhibited subjective “deliberate indifference” to an objectively “substantial risk of serious 
harm.”  Id.  Regarding the subjective component, a prison official acts with deliberate 
indifference where he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
 
3 Gerholt argues that the District Court incorrectly dismissed his Eighth Amendment 
claim against WellPath and contends that WellPath was deliberately indifferent to his 
serious medical needs by failing to provide “a more aggressive method of emergency 
care.”  See Resp. at 2-3, ECF No. 9.  As noted, however, the District Court afforded 
Gerholt leave to amend his claim against WellPath, but Gerholt did not do so.  We have 
noted that “parties voluntarily dropped from an amended complaint do not remain in the 
case,” and that claims against such defendants “may not be challenged on appeal.” 
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 221 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017).  Therefore, we will not 
consider Gerholt’s claim against WellPath on appeal. 
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safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”  Id. at 
837.   
Gerholt’s complaint includes conclusory allegations that the individual 
defendants—largely due to their supervisory roles—knew or should have known of the 
risks posed by the facility doors yet failed to guard against Gerholt’s injury.  For 
example, Gerholt alleged that Wetzel placed him “in a facility he knew or should have 
known was not fully inspected to prevent any pervasive risk situation of injury to 
plaintiff”; that Thomas “knew or should have know[n],” as the person responsible for 
facility maintenance, that cautionary tags indicating pinch points were required; and that 
St. Vincent had a duty to ensure facility doors did not open or close prematurely.  Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 11, 15-18, ECF No. 8.  Gerholt also alleged, inter alia, that all defendants 
knew “they had problematic doors” yet failed to “guard against accidents.”  Id. at ¶ 24.  
The amended complaint, however, does not contain sufficient factual matter from which 
the Court may conclude that defendants were aware that the allegedly defective doors 
could expose Gerholt to “an excessive risk” of harm and consciously disregarded that 
risk.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  As the District Court recognized, Gerholt at most 
alleged negligence on the part of the individual defendants, which is insufficient to state a 
deliberate indifference claim.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).  
Because we find that Gerholt failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference, we need 
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not address the objective prong, and we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that 
Gerholt failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the individual defendants.4 
As noted, the District Court afforded Gerholt the opportunity to cure the defects in 
his original complaint and provided guidance on how to do so.  Further, the District Court 
analyzed the sufficiency of the amended complaint’s allegations against the individual 
defendants despite having already dismissed those claims with prejudice, essentially 
providing Gerholt with a second opportunity to state claims against those defendants.  
Given that Gerholt failed to correct the original complaint’s deficiencies in his amended 
complaint, the District Court did not err in dismissing the action without further leave to 
amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile).5 
IV.  
For substantially the same reasons as the District Court and because this appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
 
4 To the extent that Gerholt challenges the earlier dismissal with prejudice of his claims 
against defendants Orlando and Soben for their handling of his grievance and against 
Soben for his alleged knowledge of the existence of the pinch point that injured Gerholt, 
we see no error in the District Court’s decision for substantially the same reasons 
described herein and articulated in the District Court’s August 31, 2020 opinion.  
5 In his response to the Court’s order listing his appeal for possible dismissal or summary 
action, Gerholt raises a host of new allegations pertaining to conditions within SCI-
Phoenix, many of which are unrelated to those in the amended complaint.  Resp. at 3-4, 
ECF No. 9.  We decline to address these new allegations for the first time on appeal.  See 
Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). 
